

Ethnic Minorities and Integration

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Outlook for the Future

Mérove Gijssberts



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Contents

Foreword	1
1 <i>What does the future hold for the integration of ethnic minorities?</i>	3
2 <i>Demographic trends</i>	7
2.1 Future migratory flows	8
2.2 The ethnic profile of the Netherlands in 2020	12
3 <i>Geographical concentration: a continuing problem in the major cities</i>	16
4 <i>Socio-economic disadvantage and development</i>	20
4.1 Education	20
4.2 Work and income	22
4.3 Rise of a middle class	23
4.4 Permanent underclass	25
4.5 Two-way split?	26
5 <i>Social and cultural aspects of integration</i>	27
5.1 Social contacts between ethnic minorities and the indigenous population	28
5.2 Cultural views and behaviours of ethnic minorities	30
5.3 The importance of education	31
5.4 Emancipation of ethnic minority women	31
5.5 Modernisation and counter-movements	32
6 <i>Mutual perceptions of indigenous and ethnic populations</i>	34
7 <i>Concluding remarks</i>	38
Appendix	44
Notes	47
References	49
List of SCP publications in English	54

Foreword

The Social and Cultural Report 2004 (*Sociaal en Cultureel Rapport 2004*) will be published in October this year. It will be the sixteenth in a series of such reports which began in 1974, one year after the creation of the Social and Cultural Planning Office of the Netherlands (SCP). The Report attempts to give an impression of Dutch society and the Dutch welfare state in the period up to 2020. In doing so, it maps out developments in a wide range of fields: developments in the number of households, in the division of tasks within those households, in the size and composition of the ethnic minority population, in democracy and civil society, in information and communication technology, in housing, work and leisure time, in healthcare, in education, in safety and in integration.

In the various foreword surveys on which the Report draws, it was decided not to use a scenario approach. This is because scenarios offer insufficient scope to allow for the developmental dynamic inherent within each of the various sectors, and for changing sets of determinant variables. Moreover, scenarios have a striking lack of historical perspective: it is as if the past plays no role whatsoever. For a point in the future that is only around 15 years hence, however, a great deal is already in place, even though there are many uncertainties and important choices still have to be made. An exploration of the future over such a short timeframe is thus not an entirely speculative exercise; there are several long-term trends and developments that are already becoming visible.

This also applies for this reflection on the future position and integration of ethnic minorities, which was written in preparation for the chapter on this theme in the Social and Cultural Report 2004. Here, too, an important place is given to developments and experiences from the (recent) past. At present, there are 1.6 million non-Western migrants from dozens of countries of origin living in the Netherlands. The composition of the present ethnic population is the result of successive migratory flows: migration in connection with the colonial history of the Netherlands, labour migration, asylum migration, family-formation or family-reunion migration and return migration. Although any forecast of the size and composition of the ethnic population is hedged in with many uncertainties owing to unpredictable national and international political and economic developments, it is safe to say that in 2020 non-Western migrants will be making a bigger impact on Dutch society than they do today. The ethnic population in 2020 will also be a young population, which will be more concentrated in the major cities than at present. This has major consequences for education, for the labour market and for the housing situation and quality of life in those cities.

It is likely that the educational disadvantage of young members of ethnic minorities will reduce and that the overall educational level of the ethnic population will rise further. This will also improve their opportunities on the labour market. Girls and women, in particular, are undergoing a rapid process of emancipation. The first generation of migrants is likely to remain dependent on benefits.

If the socio-economic future of ethnic minorities can be regarded with a degree of optimism, the future appears more sombre as regards their socio-cultural integration – the orientation by ethnic minorities towards Dutch society and relations between the indigenous and ethnic population. Several factors play a role here: the increasing concentration of ethnic minorities which reduces the chances of their mixing with the indigenous population; a strong identification with their own ethnic group; traditional views and the role of religion; feelings of deprivation, frustration and discrimination; and a growing reserve and distance on the part of the indigenous population. There has been a clear hardening of mutual relations recently. Whether this trend will be reversed depends not only on the size and composition of future migratory flows and on developments abroad (the threat of Muslim fundamentalism, the situation in the Middle East), but also on Dutch government policy and the domestic climate of opinion.

Prof. P. Schnabel
Director SCP

1 What does the future hold for the integration of ethnic minorities?

At the end of the 20th century the political debate on the integration of ethnic minorities underwent a sea-change in the Netherlands. Where the pronouncements about minorities in the Netherlands by the right-of-centre Frits Bolkestein aroused some resistance in the Netherlands in the early 1990s, the hard line taken by Pim Fortuyn in the 2002 general election campaign met with a good deal of approval. The general tenor of the discussion was one of considerable gloom regarding the integration of ethnic minorities in the Netherlands. The Dutch journalist and commentator Paul Scheffer wrote a controversial article in which he spoke of a multicultural drama, and the Lower House of the Dutch parliament ordered an inquiry into the possible failure of the integration policy in the Netherlands (Scheffer 2000; TK 2003/2004a). Political events at home and abroad during this period had a far-reaching impact on relations between ethnic minorities and the indigenous population. The latter increasingly felt that members of ethnic minorities made too little effort to adapt; members of ethnic minorities, for their part, increasingly felt they were not fully accepted in the Netherlands. Media reports about radical Islamic groups, the concentrations of ethnic minorities in the major cities and the nuisance caused by groups of Moroccan and Antillean youths brought the darker side of the multi-ethnic society into sharp relief. While from a socio-economic perspective ethnic minorities were slowly but surely becoming more and more integrated, the general opinion held that this was not the case in a social and cultural context. Moreover, there was a general consensus that the Dutch integration policy was failing.

A good deal of attention has been focused in recent years on looking back at the integration of ethnic minorities and the integration policy pursued by central government since the arrival of the first migrants some 40 years ago. Based on this sizeable body of knowledge of the past, now would seem to be an appropriate time to look ahead to the future. The central question for that future is then of course which direction the integration of ethnic minorities will take.

The term 'ethnic minorities' denotes the fact that these groups were once designated as the target groups of the minorities policy because of their disadvantaged position.¹ In the population statistics published by Statistics Netherlands (CBS) this term is not used; instead, the term 'non-Western migrants' (*niet-westerse allochtonen*) is employed.² To some extent the two categories correspond, but there are also groups that are counted as ethnic minorities – such as Southern and Eastern Europeans and Moluccans – but who fall outside the definition of non-Western migrants. For the purposes of this chapter the distinction is not of crucial importance. The main consideration is that these are groups who are in a disadvantaged position and who

therefore form the object of government policy. Some of the groups which were the focus of this policy in the early 1960s, such as Italians and Spaniards, are no longer mentioned in this debate. These groups are now able to survive in the Netherlands without requiring government attention and are in fact regarded as being 'integrated' in Dutch society. This illustrates that the groups that are the focus of attention today need not be the same as the target groups in 15 years or so. Everything turns on the key word *integration*: which ethnic groups are integrated, and to what degree?

Many different definitions of the term 'integration' are possible, but briefly it could be said that integration refers to the degree to which and the way in which ethnic minorities form part of the recipient society. This is a rather vague definition, however. It is better to draw a distinction between socio-economic and socio-cultural aspects of integration. The Temporary Committee for the Review of Integration Policy (*Tijdelijke Commissie Onderzoek Integratiebeleid*), or Blok Committee, included both aspects in its definition of integration: in addition to equal participation in the socio-economic field, equal legal status and knowledge of the Dutch language, the Committee stressed in its final report that 'generally accepted norms, values and patterns of behaviour should be respected' (TK 2003/2004a: 105). Until recently attention was focused mainly on the structural aspects of integration, with a view to eliminating the socio-economic disadvantage of members of minorities. More recently, however, the political and public debate has turned more and more towards the socio-cultural perspective.

This distinction illustrates the complexity of this issue. In the first place, the integration of minorities impinges on many different areas of life, such as education, the labour market and the housing market (structural aspects), but also in areas such as cultural and religious views, social contacts and participation in Dutch society (socio-cultural aspects). On top of this, there are all manner of interactions between the various aspects of structural and socio-cultural integration. Things are made even more complex by the wide variety of ethnic groups with very different characteristics, all of which play a role in the 'integration tempo' of an ethnic group. People of Surinamese extraction, for example, have today progressed much further down the 'road to integration' than people of Turkish and Moroccan origin. This has to do among other things with differences between these groups in terms of education level, command of the language, extent of family reunion migration and the size of the second and third generations. All these differences make it extremely difficult to paint an accurate picture of the integration of the ethnic minorities in the Netherlands in the future.

A look back at past predictions shows how difficult it was to forecast many developments (Rath & Schuster 1999). Notwithstanding, several authors have recently ventured to make future predictions about the multi-ethnic society. Broadly, two schools of thought can be distinguished. The first is dominated by pessimism about the

future: the Netherlands is heading for an ethnic schism, in which entire generations of migrants will remain disadvantaged and create a large ethnic underclass. There are also wide concerns about the concentration of ethnic minorities, for example in certain schools and neighbourhoods, but also about the position of ethnic minorities in their own circles (Scheffer 2000; Van der Zwan 2002). The second school of thought takes a much more optimistic view: the position of minorities will gradually improve and in the long term these groups will rise to higher social positions (Veenman 2002; Snel 2002).

The central question focuses on what will happen from now on as regards the integration of ethnic minorities in the Netherlands. Will their disadvantage be eliminated and will the inequality between them and the indigenous population reduce? And will the integration between indigenous and non-indigenous people improve, giving rise to social cohesion? Both these questions receive attention. The timeframe chosen for this *Social and Cultural Report* extends to 2020. On the one hand this is too far away for the theme of 'integration' to enable detailed forecasts to be made, while on the other hand, and in view of the current situation, it is too short a period to expect the integration process to be complete, if only because within 15 years the present ethnic minority generation will by no means have been replaced by a new generation.

It is impossible to describe the future of ethnic minorities in detail in all relevant fields. This study therefore seeks to do no more than provide an outline summary of what are considered to be likely developments. In order to be able to make substantiated statements about this, we examine the extent to which social trends in the past can be extrapolated into the future. In addition, developments that are considered likely are mirrored against the expectations of the Dutch (indigenous) population using a survey of people's expectations for the future that was carried out by the Social and Cultural Planning Office (SCP) (TOS'04).

The success of the future integration of ethnic minorities in the Netherlands depends in part on demographic developments. Chapter 2 therefore examines the question of how migration flows might develop in the future and what the profile of the ethnic minority population in the Netherlands will be in 2020. Chapter 3 then looks at the distribution of migrants throughout the Dutch towns and countryside. The future composition of the migrant population will have direct consequences for distribution issues in the Netherlands; at present ethnic minorities stand at a considerable disadvantage compared with the indigenous population, but how will this socio-economic inequality develop in the future? This question is the subject of chapter 4.

Attention then turns to the social and cultural aspects of integration. Will ethnic minorities in the future feel stronger ties with the Netherlands or with their country of origin? What role do their cultural views and their religion play in this? What of the emancipation of non-indigenous women? All these questions are addressed in chapter 5. Chapter 6 covers a final topic, namely relations between indigenous citizens and members of ethnic minorities. What consequences do the presence and influx of migrants have for the mutual acceptance by the two groups?

In the discussion (chapter 7), the many developments for the future are reviewed. This chapter also looks at the policy of the national government.³

2 Demographic trends

There are currently around 1.6 million non-Western migrants living in the Netherlands, from dozens of countries of origin. The present profile of the migrant population in the Netherlands is the result of migratory flows which began as long ago as the 1940s and 50s with migration from Indonesia.⁴ The 1960s brought large-scale immigration of workers from countries around the Mediterranean. The first flows were Southern Europeans, swiftly followed by Turks and Moroccans, who would – so it was originally envisaged – remain in the Netherlands on a temporary basis. The colonial past of the Netherlands also generated migration. There was already a tradition of immigration by people from Surinam, but it was only after independence was declared in 1975 that this really took off. Immigration from the Netherlands Antilles dates from around the same period, but peaked in the mid-1980s. The immigration from Surinam and the Antilles included a high proportion of women and children, whereas in the case of the immigrants from the Mediterranean these only followed years later. The 1990s were dominated by asylum immigration, with a total of a quarter of a million asylum-seekers applying for entry to the Netherlands between 1995 and 2001. Asylum-seekers from countries such as Iraq, Afghanistan, the former Yugoslavia and the former Soviet Union are particularly strongly represented in the Netherlands.

History has shown that the development towards a multi-ethnic society is a direct consequence of all manner of complex demographic process, by no means all of which were foreseen. In the early 1980s, for example, labour migration came to a halt as a result of the economic recession and increasing remigration by Turks and Moroccans. The Social and Cultural Planning Office (SCP) which in 1980 was still predicting stronger growth in the number of Turks and Moroccans in the Netherlands, adjusted its forecasts downwards (Van Praag & Kool 1982). In the early 1980s Penninx (1984) also presented a slightly different picture of the ‘colouring’ of the Netherlands: ‘(...) the factor migration is more likely to contribute to reductions than to increases in these groups in the near future’. The economic recession would lead immigrants to return to their home countries, the process of family reunification appeared to be more or less complete and immigration for family formation would rapidly decline because immigrants would increasingly find a partner in the Netherlands or set up home with a Turkish or Moroccan partner in the country of origin. The fertility figures, it was predicted, would also quickly converge with those of the indigenous population, so that ethnic groups in the Netherlands would become increasingly stable. Nothing could have been further from the truth.

These predictions from the past provide an illustration of the uncertainty surrounding relevant future developments. Just as no one could not have suspected in the 1970s that Turks and Moroccans would not return *en masse* to their countries of origin, so it was impossible to predict in the 1980s that so many Turks and Moroccans would bring over a partner from their homeland, to say nothing of the steady influx of asylum-seekers in the 1990s. Based on these developments and on a fairly ineffective admissions policy, in 1994 SCP accordingly forecast an explosive increase in the number of migrants entering the Netherlands (SCP 1994). In reality, a more restrictive policy led to a sudden sharp reduction in the influx of asylum-seekers from 2001 onwards. This made it necessary to adjust the most recent forecasts of migrant numbers downwards (CBS 2003a).

Statistics Netherlands (CBS) predicts that in 2020 more than 2.4 million non-Western migrants will be living in the Netherlands (14.1% of the population). Given that the indigenous population will shrink slightly in the next 15 years owing to population ageing, this means that non-Western migrants will make a bigger demographic impact on Dutch society than they do today. This anticipated growth does however depend greatly on the development of the welfare state and the economy.⁵ The future growth in the ethnic population is not only affected by continuing migration, but also by the natural growth of the existing migrant population. The first generation grows through migration, the second through reproduction. What demographic developments can be expected over the next 15 years?

2.1 Future migratory flows

Migration is a direct consequence of the ongoing process of internationalisation, a trend that will continue in the future. Moreover, history has shown clearly that migration is not a one-off event: primary migration almost always leads to additional family reunion migration. International migratory flows are therefore likely to retain their continuous character in the future (Van Nimwegen & Beets 2000). The direction and extent of these migratory flows will largely depend on a number of hard to predict variables, such as the future global political situation (asylum migration), the economic situation in the originating and host country (labour migration) and secondary migration for the purpose of family settlement or family reunification. (Changes in) admission requirements also play a considerable role in the extent of migration. The political debate on migration in the Netherlands focuses chiefly on the immigration of non-Western migrants, though it must not be forgotten that there are currently almost as many Western migrants in the Netherlands. In the future, however, there will be a proportionately higher number of non-Western migrants.

Asylum migration

At the end of the 1990s the number of asylum-seekers in the Netherlands was running at more than 40,000 per year. From 2001, however, this number fell quite suddenly, and in 2003 only 13,000 asylum requests were submitted. This drastic reduction is generally attributed to the stricter admissions policy of the Netherlands. Whereas in the second half of the 1990s the Netherlands was handling around three times as many asylum-seekers as the European Union (EU) average in relation to its population size, in 2002 the Dutch situation was around the EU average (CBS StatLine). A large majority of the Dutch population do not expect the number of asylum-seekers coming to the Netherlands to increase in the future (see Appendix, table A.1). CBS shares this view and in its population forecast suggests that only 8,000 asylum-seekers per year will be admitted to the Netherlands in the long term (excluding family reunion migrants) (CBS 2003a). The number of asylum migrants from both Africa and Asia is expected to reduce, although CBS does predict a steadily increasing flow of labour migrants from Asia.

The Netherlands has evolved into one of the stricter EU member states in terms of its admissions policy, and this sterner approach enjoys broad support among the Dutch population: no fewer than 80% feel that the admissions policy should be made (even) stricter in the future, though it is worth pointing out that people probably have no idea just how strict the policy already is (see Appendix, table A.1). A pertinent question here is whether harmonisation of asylum policy at European level is likely. A large majority of the Dutch population (65%) in any event believe that in the future the Netherlands will no longer be able to make its own decisions on admission, but that these decisions will be taken at EU level. Given the often conflicting national interests of the individual member states, however, this would still appear to be a long way off (Sopemi 2004; Asbeek Brusse et al. 2004).

However restrictive the policy becomes, it will never be possible to eradicate migration entirely given the present international landscape. One potential undesirable effect of the stringent policy could be to increase illegal immigration. The Rotterdam Institute for Social Science Research (RISBO) estimates that between 1997 and 2000 there were between around 112,000 and 163,000 illegal immigrants in the Netherlands each year, most of them living and working in the major cities (RISBO 2002). The government has recently announced measures aimed mainly at imposing heavier sanctions on employers and landlords who employ and house illegal immigrants (TK 2003/2004b). Research has shown that many illegal immigrants end up in the criminal circuit (Van der Leun et al. 1998). The question of illegal immigrants is a key issue for the future, especially for the major cities.

Labour migration

CBS is predicting a gradual increase in the number of labour migrants (particularly of Western origin) over time (CBS 2003a). A sharp increase is felt unlikely because population ageing will mean that other countries in the West will also be confronted with a labour market squeeze. On the other hand, greater mobility within Europe is regarded as likely in the future. This will not take on major proportions in the immediate future in view of the weak economic situation, but in the longer term CBS is forecasting 57,000 Western immigrants per year. Western immigrants are however much less attached to their host country than non-Western migrants: half the Western immigrants who moved to the Netherlands in 1995 have already left again, whereas three-quarters of the non-Western immigrants who entered the Netherlands in 1995 still live there (CBS 2003b).

The consequences of EU enlargement with the addition of ten new – mainly Eastern European – member states are still uncertain. Most member states have erected barriers against labour migration from these new member states in the early years. The Netherlands, for example, has decided to admit a maximum of 22,000 workers from the new member states in the period to May 2005. It is unclear whether many labour migrants will come to the Netherlands in the years thereafter from countries such as Poland and Hungary. The Dutch population believe they will: no fewer than 80% expect a considerable rise in the number of migrants from the new EU member states (Appendix, table A.1). Moreover, the EU could be enlarged further in the future: accession negotiations with Turkey will be starting shortly. Although these negotiations will last for many years, the result could be an increase in internal EU migration (Veenman 2002).

Developments to date, however, do not suggest that the migratory flows from the new EU member states will be particularly extensive. In the past, internal migration within the EU has proven to be lower than many had predicted, and this also applied in the 1980s following the accession of countries such as Greece, Portugal and Spain. In addition, such migration as there was proved highly dependent on the economic cycle (CBS 2004a). In 2003 fewer than 3,000 immigrants coming to the Netherlands were nationals of one of the ten new member states, half of them Polish. Immigration from these countries in the past has moreover fluctuated with the economic situation; this could mean that immigration from the new EU member states will in the future correlate with the unemployment rate in the Netherlands (CBS 2004a). The economic situation in the new member states does play a role, however. The difference in wealth between the old and new member states is wide, and it is therefore not unreasonable to assume that there may be a relatively large influx (temporary) labour migrants in the future.

Family reunion and family formation migration

Migration frequently prompts further migration. This dynamic of the migration process itself is often underestimated (Van Nimwegen & Beets 2000). First there is family reunion migration, where partners and children join the primary migrants. Family formation migration is also common, as young migrants living in the host country marry a partner from the country of origin. The majority of Turks and Moroccans living in the Netherlands, for example, still marry a partner from their country of origin (Hooghiemstra 2003). In the period 1990-2002 an estimated 60,000 'marriage migrants' came to the Netherlands from Turkey and Morocco, and this influx has increased further in recent years (Nicolaas et al. 2004).⁶ CBS, like a majority of the Dutch population, expects this influx of marital partners to continue in the future (Appendix, table A.1). Around 4,000 Turks and 4,000 Moroccans are expected to come to the Netherlands for both family settlement and family reunion (CBS 2003a). If this prediction holds water, this means that in 15 years' time 120,000 new Turkish and Moroccan migrants will move to the Netherlands for family formation and reunion.⁷

It is also not beyond the bounds of possibility that the presence of refugee groups in the Netherlands will also draw in more migrants. The influx figures for Afghans, for example, already show a trend towards increased family reunion and family formation migration. Family formation is also an important reason for migrating among Chinese people, an ethnic group that has been present in the Netherlands for a longer period. Among immigrants from Iraq and Iran, by contrast, both forms of migration appear to be falling (CBS StatLine).

The SCP Report on Minorities 2003 (*Rapportage minderheden 2003*) suggested that immigration for the purpose of marriage hampers the integration of Turks and Moroccans into Dutch society (Dagevos et al. 2003). These marriage migrants are at an immediate disadvantage from the moment of their arrival in the Netherlands due to their shaky command of the Dutch language and often inadequate education. They therefore 'depress' the average level of the ethnic group to which they belong. It is estimated that around 10% of the Turks and Moroccans currently present in the Netherlands entered the country for family formation (Dagevos et al. 2003). This is a relatively modest share of the total, but forecasts suggest that it could increase, unless the additional age and income requirements announced by the government turn out to have an effect (TK 2003/2004c).

Return migration

Since the 1960s, the number of migrants entering the Netherlands has fairly consistently been higher than the number leaving. A predominantly stable positive migration balance is also predicted for the coming 15 years (CBS 2003a). Every year, an estimated 40,000 non-Western migrants will enter the Netherlands, while around 20,000 will return to their country of origin. This means there will be an annual net increase

of 20,000 migrants, but also that the immigrant population in the Netherlands is not a stable one. Around a quarter of Surinamese immigrants and 45% of Antilleans who have entered the Netherlands since 1972 have left again. Similarly, a quarter of Moroccans and 35% of Turks have left the Netherlands again; in particular, the first groups of guest workers often remained in the Netherlands only temporarily.⁸ The same impact applies for asylum immigrants, 40% of whom have already left the Netherlands; this may be connected with the issuing of temporary residence permits to asylum-seekers. Then there is secondary migration, where migrants initially coming to the Netherlands move to different countries within the EU. For example, in recent years there has been large-scale migration of immigrants from Somalia to the UK (Van den Reek & Hussein 2003).

It is difficult to predict whether large numbers of migrants will return home in the future. A third of the Dutch population believe that many more migrants will return to their country of origin in 2020 (Appendix, table A.1). On the one hand increasing globalisation could well result in a steady increase in international mobility. On the other hand, that same ongoing internationalisation could also make it possible to combine the best of both worlds: for example, return migration among Turks and Moroccans could reduce as cheap flights make it easier for them to ‘commute’ between the Netherlands and their country of origin. Recent research suggests that older Turkish and Moroccan people, in particular, do this frequently; in fact around 50% of them actually own a home in their country of origin (Schellingerhout 2004).

2.2 *The ethnic profile of the Netherlands in 2020*

Based on the trends in migration outlined above, it can be stated with certainty that the first generation of non-Western migrants in the Netherlands will increase in the next 15 years (see table 2.1). This increase will be greatest among the Asiatic population group (CBS 2003a). A second demographic trend will however have a much greater impact in the coming years, namely the growth of the second generation. Natural population growth among ethnic minorities is relatively high owing to their young age profile and higher fertility compared with the indigenous population. Although the average number of children born to Turkish and Moroccan women has declined with enormous rapidity – 20 years ago Moroccan women had an average of almost six children compared with just over three today – they still have many more children than indigenous women. CBS is predicting a further reduction in the average number of children in the various ethnic groups in the future, though in 2020 the figure will still be higher than for indigenous women (CBS 2003a). This means that the second generation will grow much more rapidly than the first generation. The second generation of Moroccan and Antillean immigrants is growing particularly fast, though is still slower than the growth among Africans and Asiatics (the progeny of the asylum migrants). This is because more and more African and Asiatic women are

reaching childbearing age. The number of second-generation Africans is predicted to double in the next 15 years, while the number of second-generation Asiatics will almost triple (CBS 2003a).

**Table 2.1 Size and growth of non-Western migrant population groups, 1990-2020
(in absolute figures x 1,000 and in percent)**

	1990	2003	2020 (estimate)	forecast percentage increase 2003-2020
Turkey	203	341	452	+33
Morocco	164	295	432	+46
Surinam	224	321	375	+17
Netherlands Antilles/Aruba	69	129	189	+47
other non-Western countries	171	538	978	+82
total non-Western migrants	831	1623	2425	+49
of whom 1st generation	562	1004	1303	+30
of whom 2nd generation	269	619	1122	+81
% of total population	8.3	9.7	14.1	

Source: CBS (2003a, 2003b)

What do these demographic developments mean for the ethnic profile of the Netherlands in 2020? The first consequence is that the ‘new groups’ – most of whom are refugees – will in the future make a bigger impact on the multi-ethnic society. The ethnic diversity will thus increase further. In 2020 non-Western migrants are expected to form far and away the largest of these new groups (table 2.1). In 1990 persons from these countries accounted for only a fifth of the total number of non-Western migrants, in 2003 roughly a third and in 2020 around an estimated 40%. This means that almost a million residents of the Netherlands will originate from one of the other non-Western countries.⁹ At the same time this means that the ‘traditional groups’ (Turks, Moroccans, Surinamese and Antilleans) will form a numerical majority in 2020 (as these groups are still increasing rapidly in size). The number of Moroccans will moreover surpass the number of Surinamese in the coming years. Turks and Moroccans will be the biggest ethnic groups in the Netherlands in 2020.

A second significant development is that the second-generation will become increasingly dominant in the minority population as a whole. At present 38% of non-Western migrants were born in the Netherlands; in 2020 this will have risen to almost half (46%). As Moroccan women have the highest average number of children of all ethnic groups, the second generation of Moroccans will be the biggest group in 2020, closely followed by second-generation Turks. Surinamese and Asiatic migrants will also account for a sizeable part of the second generation. At the same time, CBS is forecasting that the size of the second generation will not exceed that of the first

generation until after 2030 (CBS 2003b). In the immediate future, therefore, the first generation will remain just as significant as the second. A timeframe of 15 years is in any event too short to expect a complete demographic turnaround.

A third crucial development for the future concerns the growth of the ‘third generation’ – people whose parents were both born in the Netherlands but of whom at least one grandparent was born in another country. At present the non-Western third generation is still very modest in size, at an estimated 35,000 persons (CBS 2003b). Half the present third generation consists of Surinamese, while the Turkish and Moroccan third generations are currently negligibly small. This is because second-generation Surinamese are older on average than their Turkish and Moroccan counterparts. Moreover, many Turks and Moroccans marry a partner from the country of origin; children of these marriages are included in the second generation by CBS.

Although the third generation is still small, it is growing rapidly (CBS 2003b). It increased in size by a third within the space of three years, compared with 18% growth for the second generation. This means that the third generation will become more relevant in the future. If purely linear growth is assumed (at approximately 11% per annum as in recent years), the non-Western third generation could comprise 200,000 persons in 2020, though a higher figure seems more probable.¹⁰ By way of comparison: this figure is approximately equal to the present number of ethnic minority pupils in primary schools.¹¹ CBS does in fact not include the third generation in its migrant forecasts.

The present debate is increasingly marked by calls to stop including the third generation in the ethnic minority population, based on the argument that this generation no longer suffers from disadvantage. However, it is anything but certain that progress from generation to generation can proceed so quickly. Recent research among Moluccans suggesting that the third generation has made no progress in terms of education level compared with the second generation, provides food for thought in this context (Veenman 2001).¹²

Compared with the indigenous population, the demographic structure of the non-Western migrant population is characterised by a strikingly high proportion of young people and children. Currently only one in ten non-Western migrants is aged over 50, compared with one in three in the indigenous population. This means that in 15 years’ time minorities in the Netherlands will still be a predominantly young population group. In 2020 it is forecast that 6% of non-Western migrants will be older than 65, compared with more than 20% of their indigenous counterparts. The proportion of older people will be highest among Surinamese migrants, at one in ten (CBS 2003a). The share of older members of ethnic minorities within the total elderly population in the Netherlands will thus remain small in the short term.

The main characteristic of the third generation in particular is that it is a very young group. Two-thirds are aged under ten and among Moroccans as many as 95% are aged under 10 years and three-quarters under 5. Third-generation Surinamese and Antilleans tend to be older on average, though here too young children of the most strongly represented (CBS 2003b). The second-generation migrants are in fact also relatively young: virtually no members of ethnic minorities who were born in the Netherlands are aged over 40. Half the second-generation Moroccans are even aged under 10. Among refugee groups, there is virtually no second generation, let alone a third generation. This means that within 15 years the majority of the third generation in the traditional migrant groups will be participating in education, while this will still also apply for a sizeable proportion of the second generation of these groups (including many children of marriage migrants). Moreover, most of the children of asylum-seekers will then be of compulsory school age. Depending on the extent to which disadvantage is passed from generation to generation, the influx of children from ethnic minorities could have enormous consequences for the Dutch education system.

3 Geographical concentration: a continuing problem in the major cities

The SCP survey shows that the Dutch population is worried about the concentration of ethnic minorities in parts of the major cities. A large majority believe that in 15 years American-style ghettos will have developed which are no-go areas for many people. How realistic is this scenario? It is a fact that the migrant population in the Netherlands is a young population group, most of whom live in the major cities: 40% of the non-Western migrant population live in one of the four major Dutch cities (Amsterdam, Rotterdam, The Hague and Utrecht).¹³ One in three residents of Amsterdam, Rotterdam and The Hague are members of non-Western ethnic minorities (table 3.1). These shares have increased sharply in the last 30 years, partly because of the ‘network’ aspect of much migration: people tend to migrate to cities where family or friends are already living who can help them familiarise themselves with their new surroundings (De Valk et al. 2001).

Beyond this, there is only a limited number of towns where the proportion of non-Western migrants is more than 10% (the average for the Netherlands). This is mainly the case in the larger towns such as Utrecht and Almere and former industrial towns such as Enschede and Eindhoven. Those relatively small municipalities which do have higher concentrations of migrants tend to be situated on the periphery of the major cities, for example Diemen, Capelle aan den IJssel and Zoetermeer. This means that in the vast majority of municipalities in the Netherlands only a small percentage of the population consists of non-Western migrants.

Table 3.1 Proportion of non-Western migrants living in the four major cities, 1975-2002 (in percent)^a

	1975	1980	1986	1992	1997	2003
Amsterdam	6	11	16	27	32	34
Rotterdam	6	10	14	25	31	34
The Hague	5	9	14	22	27	30
Utrecht	5	8	9	17	21	20
Netherlands	2	3	4	7	9	10

a The sharp increase between 1986 and 1992 is due to a change in the definition. From 1992 onwards, the second generation are also counted as non-Western migrants, where previously this was not the case.

Source: SCP (1998); CBS (StatLine)

The concentration of ethnic minorities will continue to be mainly a feature of the major cities in the coming 15 years. Among younger residents of the three largest

cities, non-Western migrants are now in the majority. In addition, half the children born in these cities are members of non-Western minorities, and for the 25 large and medium-sized municipalities (the 'G25') the figure is one third. Almost two-thirds of members of non-Western ethnic minorities are born in one of the major cities (CBS 2004b). These birth rates have major consequences for the future school population and labour market situation in these municipalities, but also for the geographical concentration of minorities in the future. The populations of Amsterdam and Rotterdam are expected to consist of almost 50% non-Western ethnic minorities within around 15 years (O+S 2004a, COS 2003). This growth is coming not only from the 'traditional' groups, but also from the new migrant groups. Asylum migrants, for example, after initially being spread throughout the Netherlands in reception centres, later drift towards the major conurbations (CBS 2003c).

What does this mean for the future distribution of minorities? In the four largest cities 10-20% of neighbourhoods already have a non-Western population of more than 50%. If inner-city distribution patterns continue unchanged, around a quarter of neighbourhoods in the major cities could have a non-indigenous majority population by 2020. Whether or not this is a likely development, however, depends on many factors.

One significant factor is the residential mobility of the urban population. The exodus of indigenous residents from the towns (the 'white flight') has been evident for several years (CBS 2004c) and is very likely to continue in the future, with the result that the ethnic minority population will increase even further in districts where their number is already high. This trend could be reinforced as older indigenous citizens currently living in these residents die or move into residential homes (Dominguez Martinez & Vreeswijk 2002). The homes that become vacant as a result are likely to be occupied by non-Western migrants coming straight from abroad, a trend that is already visible (CBS 2004c).

The residential mobility of ethnic minorities is just as dynamic. The first trend was for these groups to move from the old 19th-century districts to the early post-war neighbourhoods. A feature in Amsterdam, for example, is age-related segregation, with young ethnic minority families increasingly being concentrated in the suburbs while older persons continue to live in the old central districts (O+S 2004b). Just as in the United States, however, a trend is beginning in the Netherlands where ethnic minority middle classes are moving out of the towns (COS 2003; Uunk & Dominguez Martinez 2002). The first group to show such a pattern are the Surinamese, many of whom have moved from Amsterdam to Almere, for example (CBS 2000), and in the new government-designated residential developments in and around The Hague one in ten occupants is of Surinamese origin.

The ethnic minority middle class can be expected to increase (see chapter 4), and with it the exodus from the towns. This will probably mean that more and more potentially high-achieving members of ethnic minorities will be living in the suburbs of the major cities in the future. It also means that the vacant cheap inner-city housing that results from this process will be occupied by ethnic minorities with few prospects. The likely result is therefore a concentration of ethnic minorities in the large cities within the next 15 years. In fact a timeframe of 15 years is too short to expect a complete change in the profile of urban neighbourhoods (CBS 2004c).

The fact that rich and poor live apart is nothing new. What is happening now, however, is that the negative consequences of this are coming into ever sharper relief, in particular the social consequences of the concentration of minorities in certain neighbourhoods. This coincides with the deterioration of the residential environment and increased criminality. Since these developments reinforce the exodus of the middle classes, ghetto formation becomes even more likely (Van Kempen & Van Weesep 1996; Van Praag 2003a). Whether the no-go areas feared by the population actually become a reality depends not only on the socio-economic concentration of disadvantage, but also on the ethnic diversity in specific neighbourhoods. Neighbourhoods with a one-sided population profile are regarded as increasing the risk of ghetto formation. One relevant factor in this respect is that there are no mono-ethnic neighbourhoods in the Netherlands like those in the United States (Tesser et al. 1995). There are however indications that certain neighbourhoods in the major cities are becoming more ethnically homogenous (O+S 2002).¹⁴ Moreover, there are grounds for querying whether the presence of many nationalities in a single neighbourhood actually does much to promote social cohesion.

Processes such as urban restructuring can have a positive impact on the residential quality of old districts in the major cities (Van Kempen et al. 2000). These inner-city neighbourhoods are now proving very popular among young, highly educated double-earners without children (Van der Wouden & De Bruijne 2001) (the Lombok district in Utrecht is a good example). The other side of this coin is that it leads irrevocably to the relocation of low-income households (largely ethnic minority) to other neighbourhoods which in turn can turn into problem neighbourhoods.

Another consequence of segregation is its assumed negative influence on the integration of minorities. Much attention focuses in this regard on the role of schools with predominantly or wholly minority ethnic pupil populations ('ethnic schools'). More than half the population of the major cities aged up to 14 years belong to non-Western ethnic minorities. As a result, 'ethnic schools' have become a normal and unavoidable phenomenon in these areas which, given the projected increase in the percentages of young members of ethnic minorities in the major cities, will certainly not reduce in the future. Being at such a school in fact plays only a minor role in chil-

dren's learning achievements, however. Moreover, there are indications that 'ethnic schools' are teaching their pupils with increasing success: the negative effects of being at such a school have reduced in recent years (Gijsberts 2003). In a more general sense, too, there are few signs that segregation of itself influences the socio-economic position of ethnic minorities (Uunk 2002). This is not to say that segregation has no negative effects at all; the concentrations of minorities in certain neighbourhoods do present an obstacle to contact between the indigenous and non-indigenous population (Dagevos 2004). Something similar naturally also applies for 'ethnic schools': high concentrations of ethnic minorities at a school mean that non-indigenous children have virtually no contact with their indigenous counterparts.

4 Socio-economic disadvantage and development

What is the socio-economic position of ethnic minorities in the Netherlands? A first, obvious answer might be: not too good.


4.1 Education

To start with, the educational disadvantage of ethnic minorities is still very considerable: a large proportion have no secondary education certificate, let alone a further education diploma (Herweijer 2003). The majority of ethnic minority secondary school pupils are in the lower grades such as pre-vocational programmes (vmbo), and the school dropout rates are much higher than for indigenous pupils. In addition ethnic minority pupils in primary schools still lag a long way behind their indigenous peers, especially in language (Gijsberts 2003).

However, this description does not do justice to the wide differences between and within ethnic groups, nor to the progress that has been made in recent years. Turkish and Moroccan primary school pupils, for example, have made up a great deal relative to indigenous pupils and increasingly continue their school careers at senior secondary vocational level (mbo). The number of ethnic minorities following senior general secondary (havo) and pre-university (vwo) education programmes is also increasing and their participation in higher education has grown rapidly. In addition, ethnic minority girls have eliminated their disadvantage relative to boys in their own ethnic group in secondary education, and Surinamese girls have even caught up with indigenous pupils. The second generation is thus engaged in an enormous catching-up exercise.

The result of this is that the education level of ethnic minority groups has increased more rapidly in the last 15 years than that of the indigenous population (see figure 4.1). This conclusion relates only to the 'traditional' migrant groups; no time series are available for refugees. What has become clear recently, however, is that asylum-seekers are in a considerably better position in terms of education level (Van den Tillaart et al. 2000; ISEO 2004).¹⁵ Iranians are actually slightly better educated than indigenous Dutch citizens.¹⁶ The other groups are divided into a group with a low education level and a group with a very high education level (e.g. Afghanis and Iraqis). The same does not apply for all refugee groups, however; refugees from Somalia, for example, are predominantly very poorly educated, comparable with the Turks and Moroccans in the Netherlands. The proportion of people with no educational qualification is extremely high in these groups.

Figure 4.1 Education level attained by 15-64 year-old non-school-goers, by ethnic group, 1988-2002^a (in percent)



a Data on indigenous students drawn from EBB labour force survey, time series begins here in 1991.

- bao = primary education
- vbo = pre-vocational education
- mavo = junior general secondary education
- mbo = senior secondary vocational education
- havo = senior general secondary education
- vwo = pre-university education
- hbo = higher professional education
- wo = university education

Source: ISEO (SPVA '88 and '94); ISEO/SCP (SPVA '98 and '02, weighted), CBS (EBB '91/'94/'98/'02), SCP treatment (Dagevos et al. 2003)

The arrival of new generations who have been educated in the Netherlands makes it likely that the education level of minorities will improve further in the years ahead. They are only at the beginning of a process of educational expansion which began in the indigenous population 50 years ago and is now levelling off. The growing influence of the second generation and of the new groups on the overall minority population are underpinning this process, and this will be reinforced in the future by the entry of a third generation into the education system.

There are however also a number of risk factors. The settlement of new, mainly poorly educated marriage migrants will slow down this process. Moreover, educational disadvantage is transferred from generation to generation owing to the low level of cognitive stimulation in the home setting and the fact that the mother tongue is spoken in the home setting. Turkish and Moroccan children in particular, and recently

more and more Antillean children, are experiencing difficulties in their school careers as a result (Gijssberts 2003). There is no reason to suppose that this will change in the near future.

4.2 *Work and income*

Minorities are also at a disadvantage on the Dutch labour market. At present only half the non-Western minority population of working age have a job (Dagevos et al. 2003). This is largely due to the admittedly growing but still low labour market participation rate of Turkish and Moroccan women and women from refugee countries.¹⁷ The ethnic minority population is also young, which means that a relatively high proportion are still at school. Where members of ethnic minorities do work, they are strongly overrepresented at the bottom end of the labour market. The high unemployment rate among young migrants is also worrying (a third of young Surinamese and Antilleans are unemployed), and the same applies for refugee groups (a third of Afghanis, Iraqis and Somalians). Unemployment rates were also high among Surinamese and Antillean immigrants just after they had settled in the Netherlands in the 1970s. Although the unfavourable economy undoubtedly played a role here, the advantage that the Surinamese and Antilleans had in terms of education and command of the Dutch language at the very least guaranteed their rapid integration into the labour market (SCP 1998). The same mechanism appears to be operating for refugee groups.

The low labour market participation rate of minorities creates a high dependency on benefits; almost a quarter of non-Western ethnic minorities are in receipt of benefit (CBS 2003b). Disability benefit is most commonly paid to older Turks and Moroccans (as in the indigenous population), while Surinamese and Antillean single-parent families often live on social assistance benefit. There is a striking difference between the generations: one third of the first-generation Turkish and Moroccan population are dependent on benefit, as are a quarter of first-generation at Surinamese and Antillean migrants, compared with only one in ten in the second generation. It does have to be remembered here that a proportion of the second generation are still at school. Benefit dependency is easily the highest among refugee groups: 40% of Afghanis, for example, are in receipt of benefit.

This high benefit dependency has enormous consequences for the financial position of minorities in the Netherlands. Whereas one in ten indigenous Dutch households have a low income, this applies for a third of non-Western minority households, rising to 38% for Moroccans and around 60% for some refugee groups (CBS 2003b). Poverty is thus relatively common among the ethnic minorities.


And yet there were some positive labour market trends in the 1990s. The net participation rate of non-Western minorities rose by 13 percentage points in this relatively short period (figure 4.2), and the poverty rate among minorities was lower at the end of the 1990s thanks to their improved socio-economic position (Vrooman et al. 2003). The economic downturn at the start of the 21st century appears to have brought an end to this improvement, however; this was first reflected in rising unemployment among minorities.

Given the generally vulnerable position of ethnic minorities at the bottom end of the labour market, their employment and income position is even more dependent than that of the indigenous population on the state of the economy. This makes it more difficult to extrapolate trends than is the case for education, for example. Nevertheless, a few trends can be highlighted which appear set to continue in the longer term.

4.3 *Rise of a middle class*

In the first place, the labour market participation rate is likely to continue increasing gradually. Despite peaks and troughs prompted by changes in the economic cycle, the long-term trend cannot be other than upwards, primarily because the labour market participation rate of ethnic minority women will increase more and more; this trend has already become clearly visible in recent years (Gijsberts & Merens 2004). Second, there will be a replacement effect of the largely economically inactive older first generation by a second generation of ethnic minorities. Both trends in turn correlate both with each other and with the steadily rising education level of minorities.

Figure 4.2 Working share of the labour force in the population aged 15-65 years (net participation rate), by ethnic group^a, 1987-2003, (in percent)



^a Data for 1987-1993 based on CBS definition of ethnicity; 1994-2003 based on origin definition.

Source: CBS (EBB'87-'03), SCP treatment (Dagevos et al. 2003)

Also important for the future is the growth of an ethnic minority middle class. Table 4.1 shows that – despite all manner of economic fluctuations – there is an unmistakable increase in the share of working minorities with at least a middle-ranking job. The growth of the ethnic minority middle class is also visible in other ways, such as the tendency for ethnic minority families to move to the suburbs of the major cities. An interesting question for the future is whether and how the rise of the ethnic middle class will extend to other spheres of life, such as recreation or political participation. Given their rising education level, the ethnic middle class is likely to become gradually more important. At present there are a small number of Turks and Moroccans in this position, while among Surinamese and Antilleans a higher proportion can be counted among the middle class (table 4.1).¹⁸

Given their relatively high education level, it is also not unlikely that in due course large numbers of refugees will also move up to middle-ranking or senior positions. Generally, however, refugee groups are in a weak socio-economic position. If they have work at all, it is often beneath their capabilities; only a small minority have managed to secure at least a middle-ranking job. This even applies for the Iranians, who on average are the best educated. Specific obstacles such as long waiting periods for a residence permit and lack of recognition of educational qualifications have put asylum-seekers at a major disadvantage. Problems with adaptation also play a role.

The question is whether things will ever come right for this first generation of refugees, who for so long have been forced to stand inactive on the sidelines. Given the highly educated potential within their ranks, this constitutes a great waste of human capital.

Table 4.1 Share of the total ethnic population (including non-workers) with a job of at least middle-ranking level, 1991-2002 (in percent)

	1991	1994	1998	2002
Turks	7	10	9	13
Moroccans	6	7	8	15
Surinamese	19	21	28	32
Antilleans	16	27	27	32

Source: ISEO (SPVA'91 and '94); ISEO/SCP (SPVA'98 and '02); CBS (EBB'91,'02)

4.4 Permanent underclass

Despite the emergence of an ethnic middle class, there is undoubtedly a concentration of minorities in the lowest segments of the education, employment and income distributions. This is why the discussion on the formation of an underclass of minorities in the Netherlands returns with such regularity (Roelandt 1994; SCP 1998; Scheffer 2000; Tesser & Dagevos 2002). As research carried out in the early 1990s showed, ethnic minorities are strongly overrepresented in the 'underclass', though in absolute terms they by no means form the majority (Roelandt 1994).¹⁹ The weak socio-economic position of Turks and Moroccans engendered particular concerns at that time, and in reality this has remained so to the present-day. The positive developments in the 1990s have however reduced the risk of the formation of an underclass considerably (Tesser & Dagevos 2002). It remains to be seen whether the weak economy will now throw a spanner in the works. This will probably be the case for certain categories of minorities who were already in a weak position. Large parts of the older generation of Turks and Moroccans, in particular, have been on the sidelines for so long that they can be regarded as written off as regards their participation in the labour market and also largely as regards their participation in society, given their poor command of the Dutch language. This pattern seems to be being repeated for many Turkish and Moroccan marriage migrants who have little or no education and have no command of the Dutch language. A sizeable proportion of the intermediate generation – who came to the Netherlands whilst still of school age – have fallen more or less between two stools. Many of them failed to complete their education in the Netherlands and therefore have fewer opportunities on the labour market. A large number of Turkish and Moroccan women are in a vulnerable and dependent position as a result. The risks of being marginalised are also high for the dropouts in the second generation.

This means that benefit dependency will remain high in the near future, though an improving labour market, cuts in benefit, more stringent admission criteria and increased active integration efforts will tend to reduce this dependency (Veenman 2002). On the other hand, in the short term these policy measures are likely to increase poverty among ethnic minorities in receipt of benefit. Moreover, minorities who are in work are likely to continue to be overrepresented at the lower end of the labour market in the next 15 years, if only because the indigenous population is also becoming ever better educated. In the short term, ethnic minorities with a low education will often remain in temporary and poorly paid jobs which involve a good deal of physically heavy work.²⁰ There is likely to be a continuous oversupply of poorly educated ethnic minorities on the labour market in the years ahead. In the somewhat longer term this group could benefit from the ageing of the population, which could boost demand for low-skilled labour. It is also sometimes suggested that the future of these groups lies in the growing demand for personal services (Sassen 1991).

4.5 *Two-way split?*

A burgeoning underclass and growing middle class could lead to polarisation between members of ethnic minorities who are successful and those who are unable to make headway. This effect could be reinforced as more and more ethnic families achieve relatively high income status as more women go to work and families become smaller. This polarisation will probably be visible not only in education and on the labour market, but also for example in the housing and living situation. Young ethnic minority families who join the ranks of the middle classes can afford a newly-built home, whereas their less fortunate counterparts are forced to live in post-war gallery flats in underprivileged neighbourhoods. Research in the United States suggests that this could have further-reaching consequences, such as an increase in criminal behaviour within a divided ethnic group (LaFree & Drass 1996; Messner et al. 2001).

Finally, it is interesting to examine how the indigenous population feel about the future socio-economic integration of minorities. The views expressed reflect the division discussed above. Although two-thirds of the Dutch population expect a large ethnic underclass to develop, the majority still think that the position of ethnic minorities will be much better in 2020 than today in terms of education, work and income (Appendix, table A.1). A large majority also believe that ethnic minorities will have a much better command of the Dutch language and that ethnic minority women will have jobs much more frequently than now. A large minority believe that unemployment among ethnic minorities will have increased in 2020.

5 Social and cultural aspects of integration

For a long time the socio-economic disadvantage of ethnic minorities received the most attention; currently, however, the more cultural aspects of integration have become the main focus of the political and public debate. The discussion centres on issues such as command of the Dutch language, the focus of minorities on their country of origin and the cherishing – in the eyes of the indigenous population – of traditional ideas. Islam is often cited in this latter respect. It is in any event clear that opinions have hardened in recent years, partly as a result of the terrorist attacks in New York and Washington on 11 September 2001, the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq and the Palestine-Israeli conflict. The views of the Dutch population reflect this hardened climate of opinion fairly accurately. An SCP survey of the Dutch population revealed great distrust in the future cultural integration of minorities (Appendix, table A.1). A minority of the Dutch think that ethnic minorities will be less focused on their own ethnic group in 2020 than they are now, that they will have adapted more and more to Dutch culture and that religion will play a lesser role in the lives of Muslims. On the other hand, a majority believe that indigenous Dutch people will in future have more contacts with members of ethnic minorities. It is of course uncertain whether a majority would have taken this view if respondents had been asked whether members of ethnic minorities will have more contacts with the indigenous population. In any event, the SCP survey indicates very clearly that the Dutch population takes a more pessimistic view of the socio-cultural aspects of integration than the structural aspects.

In the sometimes heated public debate, the actual situation regarding the social and cultural integration of minorities is extremely relevant. This chapter draws on available data on this issue in an attempt to give an impression of this social and cultural integration and to make a few substantiated statements about the future. It should be stated in advance that it is much more difficult to present a picture of the social and cultural position of ethnic minorities than their socio-economic position. This is because relatively few data are available (especially trend data), and because socio-cultural integration is much more difficult to define since it encompasses so many different aspects. A further factor is the normative charge that this topic carries. There is little difference of opinion regarding the desirability of eliminating the socio-economic disadvantage of ethnic minorities; when it comes to the desirability of socio-cultural integration, opinions are more diverse. To what extent integration leaves scope for distinctive characteristics to be retained is for example a topic of continuous public debate.

In this chapter socio-cultural integration – in line with the *Report on Minorities 2003* – is operationalised as the degree to which ethnic minorities are in contact with the host society (the social component) and the degree to which they share a number of

generally accepted norms and values of Dutch society (the cultural component). The framework for these norms and values is a modern Western view of the world in which values such as equality (including between men and women) and secularism are the central planks. Clearly, these values are not endorsed to the same degree even in the indigenous population, and equally clearly they change over time. It is therefore neither realistic nor necessary to require complete assimilation in the sense that ethnic minorities lose all their distinctive characteristics. Much more important is that they form part of the host society in such a way that their participation in that society is not hampered and that they respect elementary Western values. From the perspective of social cohesion, therefore, it is desirable that the social and cultural distance between ethnic minorities and the indigenous population should reduce.


5.1 Social contacts between ethnic minorities and the indigenous population

Based on the available data, it is fortunately possible to make a few statements about developments in both the social and cultural aspects of integration (see also Dagevos 2001; Dagevos & Schellingerhout 2003; Distelbrink & Pels 2002). A first relevant fact relates to social integration. Survey research among minorities suggests that they have received more and more visits from indigenous citizens as time has gone by (Dagevos & Schellingerhout 2003). Nonetheless, among Turks and Moroccans in particular, most of the contacts tend to be with members of their own ethnic group rather than indigenous Dutch people (see figure 5.1). This applies for a large majority of the first generation, but also for almost half the second generation Turks and Moroccans. A worrying factor is that the percentages of the second generation who mainly have contacts with their own group have increased since the mid-1990s. Surinamese, and to an even greater extent Antilleans, much more frequently have a mixed or indigenous circle of friends. This is also reflected in the choice of partner: just over 10% of Moroccans and Turkish marriages were to an indigenous Dutch person, compared with more than 40% of the marriages of Surinamese and as many as 60% of Antillean marriages (CBS 2003b). This fairly strong focus on their own ethnic group by Moroccans and even more so by Turks also manifests itself in other areas. For example, these groups have a good deal of contact with family in the country of origin, often send money or goods to their families or own a house in their country of origin (Snel et al. 2004). Many older Turks and Moroccans also regularly commute between the Netherlands and their country of origin (Schellingerhout 2004).

Compared with Turks and Moroccans, most refugee groups have much more frequent contacts with indigenous Dutch people (ISEO 2004), a striking finding given their relatively short stay in the Netherlands and their vulnerable socio-economic position. Somalians form an exception here, being focused fairly strongly on their own ethnic group. In fact the same applies for the Chinese, a group that has had a presence in the Netherlands for much longer (Vogels et al. 1999).

A crucial factor for the future social integration of ethnic minorities relates to the opportunities for contact with their own ethnic group. Both the size of the ethnic group in the Netherlands and its proximity in the immediate residential setting of the person concerned play a substantial role, as empirical reality has shown. Turks and Moroccans in particular are affected, with those living in the major cities, for example, having fewer contacts with the indigenous population than those living outside the cities. There is also a clear correlation between living in a concentration area and mixing less with the indigenous population than those living elsewhere (Dagevos 2004). This also applies for Moluccans, for example, who – for historical reasons – live in highly concentrated communities (Veenman 2001). The social integration of refugee groups probably proceed more quickly because they are relatively small groups which are fairly widely distributed; as a result, they learn the Dutch language earlier and establish contacts with the indigenous population more readily.

Figure 5.1 Ethnic minorities who have more contact with members of own ethnic group than with indigenous Dutch people in their free time, by ethnic group and generation, population aged 16 and older, 1994-2002 (in percent)^a



^a The shares had up to 100%; this means that the other respondents in the group in question either have more contact with the indigenous population or roughly the same amount with both.

Source: ISEO (SPVA '94); ISEO/SCP (SPVA'98 and '02), weighted

The role that the indigenous Dutch play in the integration of migrants should not be left out of this discussion. Contact between indigenous and non-indigenous people requires both groups to take part. There is however plenty of research to show that in many cases the two groups prefer to maintain a distance (see e.g. Hagendoorn & Sniderman 2001). The findings of the SCP Dutch population survey provide food for

thought in this context: at most a third of the population have regular contacts with members of ethnic minorities (BOM 2002). The findings of the SCP survey also provide little hope for the future in this respect: again only a third of the Dutch population expect to have more friendly contacts with ethnic minorities in the future (Appendix, table A.1).

5.2 Cultural views and behaviours of ethnic minorities

The distance from the host society manifests itself not only in the mutual contacts, but also in the cultural orientation of ethnic minorities. A reasonable amount of quantitative information is available on the extent to which ethnic minorities endorse generally accepted views in the Netherlands. Broadly speaking, the same differences are found between and within ethnic groups. First-generation Turks and Moroccans, for example, have the least modern views on the emancipation of women, the role of religion and power relations within the family (Dagevos & Schellingerhout 2003); second-generation Turks and Moroccans have much more modern views. Surinamese and Antillean groups do not differ much from the indigenous Dutch, and the same applies for some refugee groups, such as Iranians and people from the former Yugoslavia. Afghanis and Iraqis, by contrast, are a good deal more traditional in their thinking on these cultural aspects, more or less comparable with Turks and Moroccans. It is striking that Somalians have even more traditional ideas than these groups (ISEO 2004).

Religion plays an important role in cultural integration. At present more than 900,000 Muslims live in the Netherlands (CBS 2002). Virtually all Turks and Moroccans regard themselves as Muslim, and this applies just as much for the second as the first generation. This unwaveringly strong identification with Islam is moreover closely related within these groups to a close identification with their own ethnic group. This religious identification does however appear to be becoming more and more separated from religious practice: fewer second-generation Muslims in the Netherlands visit the mosque and participation in religious associational life is lower than in the first generation (Phalet & Ter Wal 2004).

It is clear from the foregoing that there is a great deal of diversity in cultural integration between but also within ethnic groups. Surinamese and Antillean immigrants, as well as the majority of refugee groups, stand at a much shorter cultural distance from Dutch society than a large part of the Turkish and Moroccan population. The choice of marriage partner also fits in with this pattern, though it must be remembered that many migrants originating from Turkey and Morocco come from agricultural areas and are quite often illiterate. As a result, their ideas are generally more traditional than those of Turks and Moroccans who come from large cities.

5.3 *The importance of education*

The progress of the socio-cultural integration of minorities depends on a large number of factors. The observed heterogeneity between and within ethnic groups provides an insight into some of the factors that foster that integration. It has become clear that a number of individual characteristics of migrants are important here, such as their migratory generation, education level and command of the Dutch language. The fact that Surinamese and Antillean migrants are generally closer to Dutch society socially and culturally than Turks and Moroccans, for example, has a great deal to do with their higher average education level and better command of the Dutch language. This also partly explains why second-generation Turks and Moroccans have more modern views than the first generation. By contrast, recently arrived Antillean immigrants stand at a greater social and cultural distance from Dutch society, this time because of their relatively low education level and poor command of the language. The fact that refugees – despite their relatively short period of residence – already have so much contact with the indigenous population and often already have a fair command of the Dutch language, also has to do with their usually higher education level.

Several analyses have confirmed the key role of education in the social and cultural integration of minorities (Dagevos et al. 2003; Hagendoorn et al. 2003). The better educated migrants are, the more contacts they have with the indigenous population and the less traditional are the views they hold. The importance of the Dutch education system as an engine for integration can therefore not be stressed often enough. A good education is not only important in enabling migrants to attain a good socio-economic position, but also for their socio-cultural integration.

5.4 *Emancipation of ethnic minority women*

A process of emancipation has been taking place in recent years among ethnic minority women. Reference was made earlier to the improved socio-economic position of women; Surinamese and Antillean women in particular are leading this development, though second-generation Turkish and Moroccan women have also made enormous strides compared with their parents, especially in education (Gijsberts & Merens 2004). This makes it likely that the labour market position of ethnic women will improve further in the future. There are also indications that Turkish and Moroccan girls are more progressive than boys, particularly in their views on the division of tasks between men and women in the household and in bringing up children (Bouw et al. 2003). A related development is that the pattern of family formation is changing among Turkish and Moroccan women, with those in the second generation having fewer children than their parents and also starting families later. This is another indication that the emancipation of ethnic minority women is set to continue.

In the somewhat shorter term, however, the future appears less bright for younger Turkish and Moroccan women in particular than might be expected on the basis of their improved education level, mainly because their labour market participation rate is still exceptionally low. Although they have the ambition to complete a good education, marriage and motherhood ultimately become more important to them. The orientation towards their own family and community continues to shape the life choices these young women make (Bouw et al. 2003). Traditional views of marriage and family stand in the way of their participation in the labour market, as it did for a long time with indigenous women. Religious as well as cultural factors play a role here: a stronger association with Islam correlates with a more traditional family ideal and division of household tasks (see Phalet & Ter Wal 2004). These views have an impact on the emancipation of Turkish and Moroccan women in the sense that they limit their scope to choose to work outside the home, for example. The phenomenon of ‘marriage migration’ is also important for future developments. The fact that a large proportion of second-generation Turks and Moroccans marry a partner from their country of origin, often someone with a low education level and no command of the Dutch language, will in many cases do little to foster the socio-cultural integration of either partner.

5.5 *Modernisation and counter-movements*

The progression of succeeding generations and the concomitant increase in education levels would seem to herald the prospect of a further modernisation of views in the future. This also fits in with the ongoing process of individualisation which is already far advanced in the indigenous population. The views of many members of ethnic minorities on individual autonomy and on marriage and family have shifted considerably towards the Western norm and are largely supported by second-generation migrants, driven mainly by the better educated and by women.

Yet individualisation is not a process without difficulties. Second-generation non-Western migrants in particular find themselves continually caught between the modern Western culture and the more collectivist culture of their own ethnic group (Schnabel 2000). This can create a greater risk of young people becoming marginalised and turning to crime – a particular problem among Moroccans where there is a relatively wide difference between parents and children in the pace of modernisation (Distelbrink & Pels 2002; Junger et al. 2001). Background characteristics are also important according to some authors, feelings of deprivation and disappointment about failing to ‘succeed’ in Dutch society may provide fertile ground for deviant behaviour (Harchaoui 2004). This brings the threat of a revival of traditional views and a stronger focus on the ethnic group rather than the host society. The stigmatisation of the Moroccan population, in particular, has already demonstrably led to the withdrawal of this group into their own community: second-generation

Moroccans have begun to identify with their own group more and more strongly in recent years (Dagevos & Schellingerhout 2003). How easy it will be to reverse this development is anything but certain. Paradoxically enough, reactions such as these are actually exacerbated by social processes such as internationalisation and informatisation, for example because they make it easier for migrants to commute between their country of origin and the host country (cheap flights) and to maintain a stronger focus on their country of origin (satellite dishes).


These tensions are largely mirrored in the religious component. While followers of Christian religions in the Netherlands have been undergoing a process of secularisation for decades, Muslims in the Netherlands are at most at the start of such a development – though it can be tentatively concluded that religious participation by Muslims is declining, a trend that first manifests itself among the better educated. In addition, second-generation Muslims in the Netherlands appear to experience Islam in a more individual way (Phalet & Ter Wal 2004). Notwithstanding, the continuing strong identification with Islam provides food for thought. In particular, its combination with a strong ethnic identification is not without dangers.

A counter-reaction can be observed in the area of religion, too, in the form of a certain religious revival among small groups of Muslims in the Netherlands. Analyses suggest that Islam is gaining in importance mainly among the section of the Moroccan population with stronger feelings of being the victims of discrimination (Phalet & Ter Wal 2004). These reactions are reinforced by the more hard-line domestic and international climate. It is not difficult to imagine that such a situation could lead to rising ethnic tensions, particularly in the large cities. Although there appears to be scant potential for radicalisation of Muslims (Phalet & Ter Wal 2004), it nonetheless has a negative influence on interethnic relations in the Netherlands.

6 Mutual perceptions of indigenous and ethnic populations

For a long time, politicians devoted little attention to the reactions of the host society to the presence of ethnic minorities. Yet systematic research has been carried out for many years into public opinion on minorities. This research shows that ‘ethnic distancing’ by the indigenous population is by no means a recent phenomenon (Scheepers 1996; SCP 1998, 2003). As figure 6.1 shows, for at least 20 years around half the indigenous population has had a reserved or even hostile attitude to having neighbours of different ethnic origin. Similarly, around half the population have long felt that there are too many immigrants living in the Netherlands. Political refugees should be treated generously with regard to admission, but not economic refugees, is the general opinion. Objections to the settlement of marriage partners for second-generation migrants have also risen sharply (SCP 2003). The indigenous population do not hold the same views about all ethnic groups, but apply a clear hierarchy (Verkuyten et al. 1996). The most negative views are reserved for Moroccans, while opinions on Surinamese migrants are much milder (Van Praag 2003b). The image of Muslims, in particular, is generally very negative (Sniderman et al. 2003). International developments in recent years will have done nothing to mollify these opinions.

Figure 6.1 Resistance of the indigenous population to having people of a different ethnic origin living next door, 1981-2002 (in percent)^a



a Percentage with a reserved or hostile attitude.

Source: SCP (CV'81-'02)

Public opinion on ethnic minorities has become more negative in recent years. A growing opposition to having foreigners as immediate neighbours is for example visible in figure 6.1. However, this trend has been under way since around 1995, i.e. before migrants became such a prominent topic of social debate (SCP 2003), and there is no reason to suppose that this trend will alter course in the near future. The SCP survey shows that a large majority of the Dutch population attribute clearly negative social consequences to the presence and influx of ethnic minorities in the future (Appendix, table A.1). Three-quarters believe the social security system will become unsustainable due to the influx of migrants, that ghettos will form where people no longer dare to venture and that the threat of Islamic fundamentalism will increase. A large majority also believe that tensions between the indigenous and immigrant population will increase and that ethnic minorities will make no positive contribution to Dutch society.

Some people also see negative consequences for themselves personally as a result of the presence of ethnic minorities in the Netherlands. Roughly a third expect their own situation to become worse in the future due to this presence, and around the same proportion believe they will no longer feel at home in their own neighbourhoods in the near future.

An essential finding in this context is that these pessimistic views are strongly associated with feelings of being threatened by the presence of ethnic minorities (Appendix, table A.2). Fewer than 20% of those who feel greatly threatened believe that the tensions between the indigenous and ethnic population will reduce much in the future, compared with almost two-thirds of people who feel little or no threat. This correlation between feeling threatened by ethnic minorities and having a negative attitude to them has frequently been observed in research (e.g. Bobo 1988; Quillian 1995; Scheepers et al. 2002).

Earlier research also confirms that this is an important reason why people with a low education level have a more negative attitude to ethnic minorities than the better educated. The SCP survey of people's expectations for the future also shows that those with a low education level have a much more negative view of the future integration of ethnic minorities and are much more pessimistic about the social and personal consequences than the better educated (Appendix, table A.1). The poorly educated are of course confronted relatively more often with ethnic minorities at work, school and in their direct residential environment.

Recent research on the resistance to 'ethnic schools' reveals the image of higher tolerance among the better educated to be much more complex than the foregoing would suggest, however, (Coenders et al. 2004). Their resistance to ethnic minorities is found to increase sharply when they are confronted with them directly. Given the rapidly increasing ethnic population of school age and the anticipated residential

mobility of the ethnic middle class, the resistance of well-educated parents to schools with ethnic children could become more sharply pronounced in the large cities. This tendency was illustrated by the vociferous protest by well-educated indigenous parents in Amsterdam against the city council's 'postcode policy'.

Research suggests that public opinion on ethnic minorities correlates with trends in immigration (Scheepers 1996; Coenders & Scheepers 1998; Gijsberts et al. 2004).²¹ Historically, increased resistance to ethnic minorities has coincided with immigration waves. This was the case for example in 1980, when there was an influx mainly of Surinamese migrants and family reunion migrants of Turkish and Moroccan origin, but also in the 1990s when many asylum-seekers sought to enter the Netherlands (Scheepers 1996). There seems to be some evidence of a delayed reaction in public opinion (Tesser et al. 1994); this is logical given that a higher influx is only reflected in the statistics (and thus the media) after a certain time lag. This correlation is found at neighbourhood as well as national level. It is not the numbers of immigrants as such, but rather a rapid increase in their number in a neighbourhood that is seen as threatening and leads to more negative views towards minorities (Gijsberts & Dagevos 2004).

These are crucial findings in the light of future interethnic relations: the ability of Dutch society to absorb immigrants has shown itself not to be infinite. The influx of migrants and swelling of the existing migrant population that is projected for the future (see chapter 2) is unlikely to improve public opinion. Seen in this light, it is a good thing that the resistance of the indigenous population – following the domestic political developments of recent years – has been placed on the agenda.

Both indigenous and ethnic minority residents of city neighbourhoods with high ethnic concentrations have a negative view of the situation in their neighbourhood. Moreover, many ethnic minorities share the views of the indigenous population that there are too many immigrants living in the Netherlands (Van Praag 2003b). Ethnic minorities in fact have milder views of the indigenous population than vice versa. However, their views are not unanimously positive concerning the social climate with regard to ethnic minorities. A fair number of ethnic minorities have the feeling that restrictions are imposed on them and that they face some hostility. Turks are the most pessimistic in this regard (Van Praag 2003b). The fact that it is precisely the well-educated members of ethnic minorities who feel they are less accepted in the Netherlands (Gijsberts & Dagevos 2004; ISEO 2004) is worrying, especially given that they will increasingly shape the profile of the ethnic population in the Netherlands and that in most other respects they are the driving force behind integration. It may be that the unfavourable climate perceived by well-educated members of ethnic minorities is related to the fact that they come into contact more than others with changes in media reports and opinions on minorities. Moreover, they regularly

encounter obstacles in their careers as a result of discrimination mechanisms on the labour market (see e.g. Dagevos & Rodenburg 1998; Kruisbergen & Veld 2002).

The foregoing makes clear that there are problems with the mutual perceptions of the indigenous and ethnic minority populations. It should be borne in mind that an overall picture has of necessity been presented here, whereas in reality there is a great variety of views both between and within different ethnic groups. The growing gulf between successful and unsuccessful migrants outlined in chapter 4 would in any event appear not to bode well for future intra-ethnic relations. The present social climate will also harden relations between ethnic groups. The degree of contact between different ethnic groups is very important in this respect. The analyses show clearly that social contacts between indigenous and ethnic groups help ameliorate the mutual perceptions (Gijsberts & Dagevos 2004). The more contact indigenous and ethnic groups have with each other during their leisure time, and the more often they visit each other at home and in the neighbourhood, the more positive are their opinions of each other. In the present social debate, in which tensions between ethnic groups are becoming ever more manifest, this is an important conclusion.

7 Concluding remarks

Review

Looking back, what conclusions can be drawn concerning the position of minorities in the Netherlands? Both a negative and a positive answer to this question are possible. The answer is negative if we look solely at actual disadvantage in education and on the labour market, at the fact that many members of ethnic minorities do not have a good command of the Dutch language and are strongly focused on their own ethnic group, and at the situation in ethnic concentration neighbourhoods in the major cities. The existing disadvantage relative to the indigenous population are not easy to eliminate.

However, when the dynamic that exists within ethnic groups is brought into consideration, the picture becomes more optimistic. The education level of ethnic minorities is rising steadily, the labour market participation rate of ethnic women is growing and an ethnic middle class is emerging in the Netherlands. This dynamic is usually ignored in the present debate, which is characterised by pessimism and unpromising language on both sides.

This chapter shows clearly that there is a great deal of diversity between different ethnic groups. In the public and political debate, the term 'ethnic minorities' is often equated to Turks and Moroccans. While this is perhaps understandable given the specific integration problems experienced by these groups, this does not mean it is correct. Together these groups account for less than 40% of the total non-Western migrant population. Moreover, it cannot be stressed often enough that, as in other ethnic groups, there is great diversity in social position within the Turkish and Moroccan population.

There is a strong correlation between socio-economic and socio-cultural integration. Better educated migrants, for example, have far more contacts with the indigenous population, have a better command of the language and have more modern views than their less well-educated fellow-migrants. Conversely, more modern views on the division of tasks between men and women are leading to a higher labour market participation rate among ethnic minority women. In many cases these two dimensions of integration go hand-in-hand and reinforce each other (Dagevos 2003 et al.; Hagendoorn et al. 2003). Yet it cannot be assumed that things will come right by themselves: if minorities will only accept the cultural patterns of the host society, so this assumption runs, structural integration in the middle classes will follow automatically, and vice versa. In reality, however, all manner of other integration routes are possible (see also Penninx 1988; Dagevos 2001).

A high degree of structural integration can also be accompanied by a strong focus on the migrant's own ethnic group. This notion of segmented integration has received much support since the publication of Portes and Zhou (1993) in the United States (see also Waldinger & Feliciano 2004). In the US, this type of integration is observed in particular in the children of labour migrants such as Mexicans. In this case the socio-economic position of these groups does improve, but is combined with a focus on their own community. The term 'selective integration' is sometimes also used for this. This phenomenon also appears to occur within some ethnic groups in the Netherlands, such as the Chinese and Moluccan populations. These groups are definitely interested in socio-economic integration, but at the same time elect to remain within their own communities. However, this focus on their own ethnic group appears to have consequences for their socio-economic position. For example, third-generation Moluccans have made virtually no more progress in terms of education level than the second generation (Veenman 2001). At first sight there appear to be no problems for the Chinese population (their benefit dependency, for example, is low); yet there is a good deal of hidden poverty in this group, there are considerable language problems and family pressures are often great (Vogels et al. 1999).

Refugee groups in the Netherlands have a particular problem: they have extensive contacts with the indigenous population and already speak the language reasonably well, but their socio-economic position is poor. It is even doubtful whether things will ever come right for the first generation of refugees, now that they have been on the sidelines for so long. Given the highly educated potential within this group, this would be a great pity. This scenario also has dangers for the second generation of ethnic minorities from the four 'traditional' migrant groups. They strive to achieve the socially accepted goals that indicate success, but often lack the means – such as a completed education – to achieve them. This may induce a counter-reaction, causing them to withdraw into their own ethnic community. The specific circumstances of these second-generation migrants, such as their perception that they are the victims of discrimination and are caught between two cultures, undoubtedly exacerbate this situation.

The bleakest integration scenario is one where severe socio-economic disadvantage is accompanied by a strong focus on the ethnic group. This is often accompanied by a complete or almost complete inability to speak Dutch. A sizeable group of minorities are in such a hopeless position and their chances of escaping from it are not good. This applies for a considerable proportion of the first generation of Turks and Moroccans, for example, and women in particular are in a vulnerable and dependent position. All indicators suggest that Somalians are becoming a new problem group because of their very weak socio-economic position and low socio-cultural integration. Another aspect which cannot go unmentioned here is the problem of illegal immigrants living in the Netherlands: these are the people who are by definition in the bleakest position of all.

Prospects for the future

What do these developments mean for the future? Much depends on the extent and composition of future migratory flows and on developments in the political and administrative climate. It is virtually impossible to predict how quickly certain trends in certain groups will progress and whether observed counter-movements prove to be temporary or lasting. Despite all the uncertainties with which expectations for the future are hedged in, however, it is possible to indicate the likely future direction of two key issues: social inequality and social cohesion. Positive developments can be expected with regard to the elimination of socio-economic disadvantage by ethnic minorities. Without trivialising the problems associated with integration, it is likely that the position of minorities in terms of education and the labour market will gradually improve further owing to the growing numerical significance of the second generation, who are clearly doing better than the first generation. The emancipation of ethnic minority women also plays a role here. The outlook for the third generation appears even better since their parents – the second generation – are increasingly well educated. However, by 2020 the present generation of ethnic minorities will by no means have been replaced by a new generation. Eliminating disadvantage will thus be achieved in small steps, and the fact that the original deficit was so great means this process will take a long time.

The picture looks less rosy as regards the future relationship between the indigenous and ethnic minority population. Relations between the indigenous population and the Moroccan and Turkish communities, in particular, have hardened considerably in recent years. To some extent this is due to events abroad, such as the threat of Muslim fundamentalism and the tensions in the Middle East, but to a degree the cause also has to be sought within the present domestic climate of public opinion in the media and politics. This hardening of attitudes appear to be a self-reinforcing process, and as a consequence is leading to the further withdrawal of ethnic minorities into their own ethnic groups and to ever more negative views on the part of the indigenous population.

The social distance between the indigenous and ethnic population is in fact not a recent phenomenon. The attitudes of the indigenous Dutch themselves play a crucial role here; in many cases they prefer to keep members of ethnic minorities at a distance. Criticisms by the Dutch that ethnic minorities are too focused on their own communities sits ill with the fact that only a minority of the indigenous population themselves have or seek contacts with members of ethnic communities.

How much of a problem is it that ethnic minorities have contacts mainly with their own ethnic groups? After all, the indigenous population is also highly segregated in terms of social status in areas such as housing, forming relationships and friendships. On the other hand, migrants have more to gain from mixing than the indigenous population: research has shown that focusing exclusively on one's own ethnic group does not foster integration (Dagevos et al. 2003). Members of ethnic minorities who have frequent contacts with indigenous Dutch people speak the language better, for example, than those who have little or no contact, while children from ethnically mixed marriages perform better at school than children whose parents are both from an ethnic minority. The increasing segregation in the large cities is regrettable in this respect, as it leads to a reduction in mutual contacts. On the other hand, it is also claimed that a focus on one's own ethnic group can foster integration, based on the traditional idea of emancipation within one's own community. The Turkish population is often cited as an example here on account of its close-knit internal organisation. Social control within an ethnic group will undoubtedly have a positive effect, but generally speaking it has not made the Turks a strikingly successful group from a socio-economic perspective.

A key question is whether the processes of individualisation and modernisation will continue in the ethnic minority population as well. This seems likely as successive generations replace each other. The better educated and women are the main driving force behind this trend; their views on individual autonomy and on marriage and family have already moved considerably in the direction of the Western norm. Family formation by Turkish and Moroccans women also increasingly resembles that of the indigenous population. These trends appear set to continue in the future, although the social participation of these women in particular is often impeded by their own community and religion.

The identification with Islam is as strong as ever among Turks and Moroccans, including in the second generation. On the other hand, people increasingly appear to be practising Islam on a more individual basis, and visits to the mosque are declining. Where the process of secularisation is already far advanced in the indigenous population, however, Muslims in the Netherlands are at most at the start of such a trend – a trend which may in any event take a different course for them.

Individualisation processes among ethnic minorities are anything but smooth, and the possibility of a counter-movement is ever-present. Second-generation Moroccans, in particular, are showing a tendency to withdraw into their own community. There is also a threat of a radicalisation of Islam among small groups of Muslims in the Netherlands. This appears to be the result of an interplay of factors, such as the tensions referred to earlier between Western culture and the ethnic group's own culture, and feelings of underprivilege and discrimination.

Education plays a crucial role in the integration of minorities. A good education not only increases their chance of securing a good position on the labour market, but also fosters their socio-cultural integration. Better educated members of ethnic minorities have more contacts with the indigenous population and hold more modern views than their less well-educated fellow-migrants. Yet a good education does not of itself guarantee work: even well-educated members of ethnic minorities encounter obstacles on the Dutch labour market. Illustrative in this respect is the vulnerable socio-economic position of the largely well-educated refugee groups. A good education also provides no guarantee of socio-cultural integration: it is precisely the better educated members of ethnic minorities who feel less accepted in Dutch society.

How much immigration there will be in the years ahead is difficult to predict because it depends greatly on external political and economic circumstances. Given the present international landscape, it will never be possible to eliminate migration entirely. Extensive immigration is however detrimental to the integration process of minorities already in the Netherlands (Dagevos et al. 2003). This means that the sustained high level of immigration of marriage migrants forecast by CBS will impede the integration of Turks and Moroccans. A poor command of the Dutch language and a low education level means these marriage migrants are at an immediate disadvantage. Antillean immigrants coming to the Netherlands in the last five years are also a problem group in terms of integration. The disadvantaged position of these migrants will in time also affect their children, who start school with a language deficit. As a large proportion of migrants are themselves now beyond school age, the only way to reach them is through special integration programmes. Seen in this light, a well-organised integration system is of great importance in ensuring the smooth integration of newcomers, both now and in the future.

The role of policy

At the end of the 1990s there appeared to be an almost universal public consensus that the Dutch integration policy pursued to that point had failed. The policy of previous governments was regarded as too lame and as taking too little account of the limits to the absorption capacity of Dutch society. The view was generally endorsed that the government had placed too much emphasis on the individual identity of migrants, increasing the risk of socio-economic disadvantage and the likelihood that they would not endorse generally accepted Dutch norms and values (Scheffer 2000). In the beginning of the 1990s the SCP was already placing question marks against the government's strict adherence to multiculturalism (Tesser 1994; SCP 1998; Schnabel 2000).

The current integration policy has taken on a more stringent character, partly as a reaction to the minorities policy in the past (TK 2003/2004c). The policy on integration programmes is an example. The present emphasis on these integration programmes and the use of 'dual programmes' – combining language instruction with

(preparation for) work, vocational training, etc. – is a promising development. The integration policy even has positive side-effects in that it appears to be bringing established female migrants out of their isolation. However, question marks have been placed against the idea of providing of integration programmes in the country of origin and of forcing elderly migrants (up to 65 years of age) to participate in Dutch language courses. The idea of making migrants to pay for these courses themselves is not without problems given their weak income position. It is quite clear that in the case of meducated and middle aged people the mastering of a new language will be a long and tiresome process.

A policy, discussed but not adopted by the government, aimed at actually ‘forcing’ minorities to spread throughout the country could also prompt angry reactions from the indigenous population, especially if this were to be seen as having a detrimental effect on the educational opportunities of their children (the creation of new ‘ethnic’ schools).

The policy of the present government is to place more responsibility on the citizen, including when it comes to integration. This policy is not without problems, and these problems are exacerbated as government spending cuts cause key elements of the integration policy to be placed in the hands of local authorities and school boards. The ending of the subsidised employment measure makes the position of minorities in particular extra vulnerable.

On top of this, the pressure on the major cities in particular will only increase in the years ahead as a result of the influx of disadvantaged newcomers and the outflow of the indigenous and – increasingly – ethnic middle classes. These high levels of residential mobility also create additional problems in relation to liveability and safety. This is an argument for doing everything possible to try and persuade the high-potential middle classes – both indigenous and ethnic – to stay in the major cities (Van der Wouden & De Bruijne 2001).

Integration is also largely a question of time. History has shown that the integration of large groups of migrants requires several generations. The migrants who came to the Netherlands in the 1950s from Indonesia and in the 1960s from Southern Europe are no longer numbered among the disadvantaged groups, and the Surinamese immigrants who came mainly in the 1970s are rapidly becoming fully integrated. Turkish and Moroccans migrants, most of whom came to the Netherlands much later, have also begun catching up with the indigenous population, though here the continuous influx of new migrants is impeding this process.

Appendix

Table A.1 Expectations of Dutch population aged 16 and over on the future of migration and integration (percentage of respondents agreeing with the statement)^a

	total	16-34	age		low	education	
			35-54	55+		medium	high
<i>migration and admission</i>							
in 2020 a lot more asylum-seekers will come to the Netherlands than now	35	40	31	35	43	33	25
in 2020 many migrants in the Netherlands will have returned to their country of origin	33	34	30	35	36	35	23
in 2020 a large proportion of migrants will come from one of the new EU member states	81	78	80	87	84	81	75
in 2020 migrants will bring over a marriage partner from the country of origin more often than now	63	61	58	73	75	63	39
the Dutch admissions policy must be made stricter in the next five years	80	80	77	82	87	79	64
the Netherlands will still be determining its own admissions policy in 2020	36	32	37	40	38	35	34
<i>integration in 2020</i>							
most ethnic minorities will be much better integrated in Dutch society than now	55	51	53	61	51	55	61
structural integration							
ethnic minorities will be better off than now in terms of education, work and income	69	69	67	72	65	69	77
ethnic minority women will have jobs much more often than now	68	66	68	71	64	66	79
there will be a large ethnic underclass	68	66	66	70	74	64	59
ethnic minorities will speak the Dutch language much better than now	65	61	64	70	59	64	77
unemployment among ethnic minorities will be higher	43	38	43	48	50	42	30
cultural integration							
ethnic minorities in the Netherlands will be less focused on their own ethnic group than now	41	38	39	49	42	39	43
religion will play less of a role in the lives of Muslims in the Netherlands than now	23	21	20	28	22	21	28
ethnic minorities will have increasingly adapted to the Dutch culture	44	43	43	48	37	46	58
indigenous Dutch people will have much more contact with ethnic minorities than now	59	57	57	64	55	57	69

Table A.1 Expectations of Dutch population aged 16 and over on the future of migration (cont.) and integration (percentage of respondents agreeing with the statement)^a

	total	16-34	age 35-54	55+	low	education medium	high
<i>social consequences in 2020</i>							
the social security system will have become financially unsustainable due to the influx of migrants	74	73	71	81	84	72	56
the threat from Muslim fundamentalism will be greater than now	74	74	73	77	84	72	59
tensions between the indigenous and ethnic populations of the Netherlands will lower than now	38	35	35	46	34	39	47
the presence of ethnic minorities will make a positive contribution to Dutch society	40	38	38	46	34	39	56
there will be ghettos in the larger Dutch cities where many people dare not go	72	68	71	77	78	71	61
<i>personal consequences</i>							
in five years' time I will have more friendly contacts with ethnic minorities	31	37	30	28	24	34	45
in five years' time I will no longer feel at home in my own neighbourhood due to the presence of ethnic minorities	30	32	25	34	40	26	16
my own situation in the future will be worse because of the presence of ethnic minorities in the Netherlands	39	42	36	39	49	35	22

a Respondents answering 'don't know' or 'no opinion' have been left out of the calculations. This category is in generally modest in size (usually no more than 10% of the respondents).

Source: SCP (TOS04)

Table A.2 Correlation between perceived ethnic threat^a and future expectations regarding minorities and integration (percentage of respondents agreeing with the statement)^b

	perceived ethnic threat	
	low	high
<i>migration and admission</i>		
in 2020 a lot more asylum-seekers will come to the Netherlands than now	22	50
in 2020 many migrants in the Netherlands will have returned to their country of origin	36	28
in 2020 a large proportion of migrants will come from one of the new EU member states	77	83
in 2020 migrants will bring over a marriage partner from the country of origin more often than now	48	77
the Dutch admissions policy must be made stricter in the next five years	52	98
the Netherlands will still be determining its own admissions policy in 2020	36	36
<i>integration in 2020</i>		
most ethnic minorities will be much better integrated in Dutch society than now	74	34
structural integration		
ethnic minorities will be better off than now in terms of education, work and income	84	54
ethnic minority women will have jobs much more often than now	86	48
there will be a large ethnic underclass	54	81
ethnic minorities will speak the Dutch language much better than now	85	39
unemployment among ethnic minorities will be higher	29	58
cultural integration		
ethnic minorities in the Netherlands will be less focused on their own ethnic group than now	57	33
religion will play less of a role in the lives of Muslims in the Netherlands than now	31	17
ethnic minorities will have increasingly adapted to the Dutch culture	72	21
indigenous Dutch people will have much more contact with ethnic minorities than now	76	39
<i>social consequences in 2020</i>		
the social security system will have become financially unsustainable due to the influx of migrants	47	91
the threat from Muslim fundamentalism will be greater than now	49	89
tensions between the indigenous and ethnic populations of the Netherlands will lower than now	61	17
the presence of ethnic minorities will make a positive contribution to Dutch society	72	14
there will be ghettos in the larger Dutch cities where many people dare not go	54	84
<i>personal consequences</i>		
in five years' time I will have more friendly contacts with ethnic minorities	53	11
in five years' time I will no longer feel at home in my own neighbourhood due to the presence of ethnic minorities	3	64
my own situation in the future will be worse because of the presence of ethnic minorities in the Netherlands	5	78

a The perceived ethnic threat was measured by constructing a scale based on the following two items that are widely used in opinion research: 'ethnic minorities abuse social provisions', and 'all those foreign cultures constitute a threat to our own culture'. Respondents were able to indicate on a five-point scale that much they agreed with these statements. The Cronbach's alpha of the scale is 0.70. For the presentation in this table the scale was divided into three categories; the middle category was omitted for the sake of clarity (all the scores in this category wherein the intermediate range).

b Respondents answering 'don't know' or 'no opinion' have been left out of the calculations. This category is in generally modest in size (usually no more than 10% of the respondents).

Source: SCP (TOS04)

Notes

- 1 These target groups can be divided into two main groups. First there are those that are counted as ethnic minorities on the basis of the country of origin of their parents. This group comprises Turks, Moroccans, Surinamese, Antilleans/Arubans, Portuguese, Spaniards, Italians, Greeks, Tunisians, Cape Verdeans and a proportion of (former) Yugoslavians (labour migrants from the 1960s and 70s). The second group are counted as minorities on the basis of other characteristics: Moluccans, refugees, asylum-seekers who have been granted residency, caravan-dwellers and gypsies.
- 2 Non-Western migrants are defined here as people at least one of whose parents was born in Turkey, Morocco, Surinam or the Netherlands Antilles and Aruba, as well as a large number of non-Western countries in Asia and Africa.
- 3 Municipalities pursue their own minorities policy. For a detailed discussion of municipal education and employment policy see the SCP *Report on Minorities 2003 (Rapportage minderheden 2003)*.
- 4 Indonesians are in fact counted as *Western* migrants.
- 5 The CBS forecast on migrant numbers is based on the most probable developments. Depending on the direction taken by Europe, various scenarios are possible. The two most extreme scenarios with regard to the migrant population are the *global economy* scenario and the *regional community* scenario. In the *global economy* scenario, high economic growth is accompanied by a less generous welfare state, leading to a higher proportion of migrants. In the *regional community* scenario the present welfare state is maintained and there is virtually no economic growth. In this scenario fewer migrants are expected in the longer term than projected in the most likely scenario according to CBS.
- 6 It should be noted here that this number is based on available CBS figures which portray the reasons given by immigrants for migrating in a given year, provided those immigrants have in the meantime not departed again, died or become naturalised. Distributions by migration motives for earlier years on the basis of figures as at 1 January 2003 need therefore not necessarily be representative of the migratory flow in the year in question. It may be expected that the figures for family-formation and family-reunion migrants are reasonably representative, however, since they often continue living in the Netherlands (in contrast to labour migrants from Western countries, for example).
- 7 This estimate excludes return migrants. It may however be expected that return migration is not common among family-formation and family-reunion migrants.
- 8 Of the first groups of guest workers who came to the Netherlands in the mid-1960s, 70% of the Moroccans and 85% of the Turks have returned home, whereas the majority who came to the Netherlands after 1993 still live there (CBS StatLine).
- 9 According to CBS forecasts, in 2020 there will be almost 300,000 ethnic minorities from African countries in the Netherlands, 550,000 of Asiatic origin and more than 100,000 from Latin American countries (CBS 2003a).

- 10 There is a high probability that the third-generation Turkish and Moroccan population will grow at a more than linear rate, though this depends greatly on the extent to which members of the second generation bring over a marriage partner from their country of origin.
- 11 It should be noted that this is a very general estimate. Unfortunately CBS does not have any forecasts for the growth of the non-Western third generation.
- 12 The comment should be made here that the data were gathered in 'Moluccan municipalities'. This may mean that the social position of Moluccans is portrayed too negatively, because Moluccans living outside these municipalities are on average slightly better educated (Veenman 2001). However, this does not explain the fact that the third generation is performing less well.
- 13 This holds most strongly for Moroccans (48%) and Surinamese (55%), and to a lesser extent for Turks (36%), Antilleans (34%) and other non-Western migrants (31%). By way of comparison, of the total population of the Netherlands, 13% live in one of the four largest cities (CBS, StatLine: figures for 2002).
- 14 This applies, for example, for Moroccans living in the Nieuw West district of Amsterdam. The research bureau of the municipality of Amsterdam suggests that this has to do with the availability of relatively large, cheap housing and that this is a self-reinforcing process because the district is known among Moroccans as an attractive location where friends and family are already living (O+S 2002).
- 15 SCP and ISEO jointly carried out a survey in 2003 on the social position and amenities use of ethnic minorities (SPVA) among five large refugee groups: Iraqis, Iranians, Afghans, Somalians and former Yugoslavians (see ISEO 2004). Previous editions of the SPVA survey were conducted among the four large traditional minority groups (Turks, Moroccans, Surinamese and Antilleans).
- 16 This is based on the diplomas obtained in the country of origin.
- 17 No more than a quarter of the Turkish, Moroccan, of Danny, Iraqi and Somalian women in the Netherlands are in work. By contrast, the labour market participation rate of Surinamese women is higher than that of indigenous women.
- 18 Among the new groups, only Iranians and former Yugoslavians achieve a percentage of 20% (of the ethnic group with at least a middle-ranking job). The figure for Afghans and Iraqis is around 10%, and for Somalians less than 4%. By way of comparison, this applies for half the indigenous population.
- 19 According to Roelandt's calculation (1994), 70% of the underclass as defined by him comprises indigenous citizens.
- 20 Chapter 6 shows that the number of people performing physically heavy work has barely decreased in recent decades.
- 21 A deteriorating economic situation (rising unemployment) also appears to influence public opinion on minorities, though these findings are less robust.

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